Four events promote a contingent, and they are not variations on one idea. The obvious one is that the primary died before the owner. The second is a survival requirement, and it can come either from the contract or from state law. The Uniform Probate Code, adopted in whole or in part by many states, provides that for a provision of a "governing instrument" relating to surviving an event, "an individual who has not been established by clear and convincing evidence to have survived the event by 120 hours is deemed to have predeceased the event," and its definition of a governing instrument expressly includes an insurance or annuity policy, a payable-on-death account and a retirement plan. So a primary who dies in the same accident and outlives the owner by an hour can be treated as having predeceased. The Code yields where the instrument itself deals explicitly with simultaneous death or sets its own period, so the contract has to be read alongside the statute rather than instead of it. The third is a disclaimer, discussed below. The fourth is a lapse for any other reason the instrument specifies, such as a charity that no longer exists or a trust that was never funded.
The disclaimer is the reason this role is worth planning rather than filling in. A qualified disclaimer under Internal Revenue Code section 2518 lets a beneficiary refuse an inheritance without being treated as having made a gift of it: section 2518(a) provides that the interest is treated "as if the interest had never been transferred to such person." That is a genuinely useful planning tool, most obviously where an older surviving spouse would rather the money went straight to the children. But four conditions have to be met, and two of them decide whether the tool is available at all.
Section 2518(b)(2) requires the written refusal to reach the transferor, their legal representative, or the holder of legal title no later than nine months after the transfer creating the interest, which for an inheritance means nine months after the death, not nine months after anyone found out. Section 2518(b)(3) requires that the person "has not accepted the interest or any of its benefits," which is the requirement that actually fails in practice: a single distribution taken from an inherited account inside the window destroys the disclaimer. And section 2518(b)(4) requires that the interest pass "without any direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer," to the decedent's spouse or to someone other than the disclaimant. That last requirement is why the contingent slot matters: the person disclaiming cannot say where the money should go. If a contingent is named, it goes to them automatically. If none is named, it goes wherever the contract's default sends it, which is usually the estate, and the disclaimer may achieve nothing the disclaimant wanted.
Two refinements worth carrying. Section 2518(a) treats the interest as though it were never transferred, which is not the same as treating the disclaimant as having predeceased the owner. Where the share actually lands is decided by the instrument and by state law, which is exactly the question per stirpes language answers. And section 2518(b)(4)(A) permits property disclaimed by a surviving spouse to pass to that spouse, so the blanket statement that a disclaimant can never benefit is too broad.
The default when no contingent is named is set by the contract or the plan, and a concrete example makes the point better than a generalization. The federal Thrift Savings Plan publishes its order of precedence in regulation: a deceased participant's account is paid first to any designated beneficiary, then to the spouse, then to the children and the descendants of deceased children by representation, then to the parents, then to the executor or administrator of the estate, and finally to next of kin under the law of the participant's domicile (5 CFR 1651.2). Private contracts write their own orders and they are frequently shorter, ending at the estate much sooner. One important exception runs the other way: for a married participant in a workplace retirement plan such as a 401(k), the tax code's own survivor rules make the surviving spouse the default, so a blank form there does not send the account to the estate. The same regulation is a useful illustration of how much room a form usually gives: the TSP permits up to 20 primary and contingent beneficiaries in total, and provides flatly that "a participant cannot use a will to designate a TSP beneficiary."
One caution about divorce, because it splits by asset and the national version of the rule is wrong for a large share of readers. For a workplace retirement plan or employer group life insurance, both governed by ERISA, the designation on file controls regardless of a divorce decree, because state revocation-on-divorce statutes are preempted. For an IRA, an individually owned life insurance policy, or a payable-on-death account, a state statute can revoke a former spouse's designation automatically; the Supreme Court counted 26 states in 2018 as having adopted revocation-on-divorce laws on the Uniform Probate Code model, which reach nonprobate assets. A contingent named years ago behind an ex-spouse can therefore be promoted in one case and not the other, from the same divorce.