The line against the recordkeeper is drawn by discretion, not by contract. ERISA section 3(21)(A) makes a person a fiduciary "to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect ... or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." The repeated word discretionary is what separates the two roles, with one exception worth noting: the clause about plan assets requires no discretion at all, so anyone exercising authority or control over the money is a fiduciary as to that conduct. A recordkeeper that processes a distribution request according to instructions is performing a ministerial function. Someone who decides whether a participant's circumstances satisfy the plan's hardship standard is exercising discretion, and is a fiduciary for that act whatever the service agreement says. Function, not title, and not the contract.
What the office actually owes. The administrator is the party that must furnish the summary plan description on the statutory schedule, produce plan documents on written request, file the plan's annual report, deliver participant fee disclosures, decide benefit claims, and run the appeal when a claim is denied. Two of those carry personal exposure: ERISA section 502(c)(1) allows a court, in its discretion, to hold an administrator "personally liable" on a per-day basis for failing to furnish requested information within 30 days, and fiduciary breaches are enforceable against the individual.
Delegation reduces work, not responsibility. An employer can hire a recordkeeper, a third-party administrator, and an investment adviser, and most do. What that outsourcing cannot do is move the section 3(16) office itself unless a provider formally accepts the designation in the plan document, which is a specific and separately priced service rather than part of a standard recordkeeping contract. Even where duties are delegated, a duty to monitor remains with the fiduciary who did the appointing: the Department of Labor's long-standing interpretive bulletin at 29 CFR 2509.75-8 states that "at reasonable intervals the performance of trustees and other fiduciaries should be reviewed by the appointing fiduciary in such manner as may be reasonably expected to ensure that their performance has been in compliance with the terms of the plan and statutory standards." The Department's participant fee-disclosure rule illustrates the pattern precisely: 29 CFR 2550.404a-5 places the disclosure duty on "the plan administrator, as defined in section 3(16)," while allowing the administrator to rely reasonably and in good faith on information the recordkeeper supplies. The data comes from the vendor; the obligation stays with the employer.
Where the two statutory names diverge in practice. Because ERISA section 3(16) and Code section 414(g) point at the same office, the parties rarely differ. But the duties are separately enforced: the disclosure and fiduciary obligations belong to the Department of Labor's title, and the tax qualification obligations to the IRS's. A plan can be run in a way that satisfies one regulator and exposes the employer to the other.