"Never transferred" is not "predeceased," and the difference decides where the property goes. Section 2518(a) removes the transfer for tax purposes; it does not rewrite the instrument. What the property does next is a question for the beneficiary designation, the will or the trust, read under state law. If a form names a contingent beneficiary, that person takes. If the document uses per stirpes language, that language answers it. If neither says anything, the default clause does, and the default is often the estate, which is usually the outcome the disclaimant was trying to avoid. Treating the disclaimant as having died first is a convenient shorthand that gives the right answer often enough to be dangerous.
The age-21 clock, which almost nothing outside the statute mentions. Section 2518(b)(2)(B) measures the nine months from the later of the transfer or "the day on which such person attains age 21," and Treasury Regulation 25.2518-2(d)(3) adds the part that makes it usable: "Any actions taken with regard to an interest in property by a beneficiary or a custodian prior to the beneficiary's twenty-first birthday will not be an acceptance by the beneficiary of the interest." So a child who inherits at eight, whose custodian spends the money on school fees for a decade, still has until nine months after their twenty-first birthday to disclaim whatever is left, and the custodian's spending is not held against them.
What acceptance actually means. This is the condition that fails in practice, and Treasury Regulation 25.2518-2(d)(1) is specific in both directions. Acceptance "is manifested by an affirmative act which is consistent with ownership": using the property, accepting dividends, interest or rents from it, directing others to act with respect to it, or exercising a power of appointment over it. Accepting "any consideration in return for making the disclaimer is an acceptance of the benefits of the entire interest disclaimed," so a side deal defeats the whole thing. On the other side, the regulation says merely taking delivery of an instrument of title is not acceptance; neither is the fact that local law vested title in the disclaimant automatically at the death; neither is a fiduciary's act to preserve or maintain the property, where the disclaimant is also the executor; and a joint tenant does not accept a residence merely by having lived in it. Accepting one interest does not, by itself, accept a separate interest in the same property.
Fractions, powers, and the transfer that counts as a disclaimer. Three provisions in section 2518(c) do most of the practical work. Under (c)(1) a disclaimer of "an undivided portion of an interest" is a qualified disclaimer of that portion, so a beneficiary can refuse a percentage and keep the rest. Under (c)(2) "a power with respect to property shall be treated as an interest in such property," so a trustee's or beneficiary's power can be disclaimed on the same terms as ownership. And under (c)(3) a written transfer of the person's entire interest, meeting requirements similar to the timing and non-acceptance conditions, to the person or persons "who would have received the property had the transferor made a qualified disclaimer," is itself treated as a qualified disclaimer.
That last one is the bridge between two separate tests. Federal qualification and state-law validity are different questions. A disclaimer can be perfectly good under state law and fail section 2518, most obviously if the state's window is longer than nine months. It can also fail under state law and still work federally, which is what (c)(3) is for: hand the entire interest, in writing and in time, to exactly the people who would have taken it anyway, and the federal result follows even though the disclaimer itself did not operate. Treasury Regulation 25.2518-1(c) addresses the local-law question directly for interests created before 1982 and leaves the paragraph for later interests reserved, so the regulation itself says nothing about the modern case and (c)(3) is the provision to work with. The same regulation adds one useful detail at (c)(2): a disclaimer that is merely voidable by the disclaimant's creditors is still qualified, but one that is wholly void, or that creditors actually void, cannot be.
The surviving spouse's exception, and the post-mortem planning it makes possible. The general rule is that the property must not pass to or for the benefit of the disclaimant. Section 2518(b)(4)(A) carves out property passing to the decedent's spouse, and Treasury Regulation 25.2518-2(e)(2) explains how far that reaches: a surviving spouse's disclaimer is fine if the interest passes without her direction "either to the surviving spouse or to another person," unless she keeps the right to direct the beneficial enjoyment of the disclaimed property in a transfer not subject to federal estate or gift tax, and even then a power limited by an ascertainable standard is allowed. That is what lets a surviving spouse disclaim property into a trust she herself benefits from. It is the mechanism behind a will drafted to leave everything to the spouse with a trust standing behind it, so the family can decide, after the first death and with real numbers, how much to divert into the trust and how much the survivor should simply own.