The machinery the statute supplies is the part worth reading, because the general argument about whether to use a springing document at all is settled ground. Published power of attorney covers that argument in full. What follows is the set of rules that decide whether a springing document actually works when the family reaches for it, and they are rules most documents either use or leave on the table.
Rule one: the principal may name the person who decides. Maine's 18-C section 5-909(2) provides that where a power of attorney becomes effective on a future event or contingency, "the principal, in the power of attorney, may authorize one or more persons to determine in a writing or other record that the event or contingency has occurred." Two things follow. The determination has to be written down, so the agent ends up holding two documents rather than one, and the bank will want both. And the principal can name more than one person, which is the cheapest available answer to the objection that a named physician may have retired, moved or died by the time the document is needed.
Rule two: if nobody was named, the statute supplies someone, and which someone depends on why the principal cannot act. Section 5-909(3) applies where the trigger is incapacity and either the principal authorized nobody or the person authorized is "unable or unwilling" to make the determination. The power of attorney then becomes effective on a written determination by a physician, if the incapacity is of the kind described in section 5-902(5)(A), or by "an attorney, a judge or an appropriate governmental official" if it is the kind described in section 5-902(5)(B).
Those two paragraphs are the surprise in this area. Section 5-902(5) defines incapacity as an inability to manage property or business affairs because the individual either (A) "is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication or other cause to the extent that the individual lacks sufficient understanding, capacity or ability to receive and evaluate information or make or communicate decisions" about those affairs, or (B) is "missing," "detained, including incarcerated in a penal system," or "outside the United States and unable to return." The second limb has nothing to do with health, which is why a lawyer, a judge or a government official certifies it and a physician does not. A springing document drafted as though incapacity always means a diagnosis quietly gives up the limb that covers a deployment, a detention or a hospital stay in another country.
Rule three, and the one that answers the standard objection: the certifier gets a federal right to the records. Section 5-909(4) provides that a person authorized by the principal to determine that the principal is incapacitated "may act as the principal's personal representative pursuant to the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 . . . to obtain access to the principal's health care information and communicate with the principal's health care provider." Without something of that kind, a certifier can be asked to certify a condition nobody is permitted to tell them about. It works because federal health privacy law defers to state law on who counts as a personal representative, so a state statute saying "this person is one" is effective for that purpose. A separate signed HIPAA authorization does the same job by a different route and is worth having anyway, because it is not limited to the person making the determination.
None of this is national law. These are state statutes, and the states that have enacted the uniform act have not enacted identical texts. Washington sits inside the same uniform-act chapter and did not take the durable-by-default rule at all: RCW 11.125.040 provides that authority "terminates upon the incapacity of the principal unless the writing contains the words 'This power of attorney shall not be affected by disability of the principal,' or 'This power of attorney shall become effective upon the disability of the principal,' or similar words." That second phrase is a springing trigger written into a durability statute, in a state whose code never uses the word. The general point for a reader is that the document in front of you is governed by one state's version, and the sentence about when it starts is worth finding before it is needed rather than after.