The form itself is specified in unusual detail, which is why a form downloaded from one hospital is often rejected at another. Section 164.508(c)(1) sets six core elements a valid authorization must contain: a description of the information identified "in a specific and meaningful fashion"; the name or other specific identification of the person or class of persons authorized to make the disclosure; the name or other specific identification of the person or class of persons to whom it may be made; a description of each purpose, for which the phrase "at the request of the individual" is sufficient when the individual initiates it; an expiration date or an expiration event; and the individual's signature and date, with a description of the signer's authority if a personal representative signs.
On top of those, section 164.508(c)(2) requires three statements: the right to revoke in writing, with either the exceptions and the method or a reference to the entity's own privacy notice; whether treatment, payment, enrollment or eligibility can be conditioned on signing; and "the potential for information disclosed pursuant to the authorization to be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by this subpart." That third statement is the one to read twice. Once information has lawfully reached someone who is not a covered entity, the privacy rule stops following it. Section 164.508(c)(3) adds a plain-language requirement, and (c)(4) requires the entity to give the individual a copy of the signed authorization.
Five defects make an authorization invalid, under section 164.508(b)(2): the expiration date has passed or the expiration event is known to have occurred; it was not filled out completely as to a required element; it is known to have been revoked; it violates the compound-authorization or conditioning rules; or "any material information in the authorization is known by the covered entity to be false." The first of those is the one that bites a document signed years in advance and then filed away, since an authorization written with a fixed expiration date can quietly stop working while everyone assumes it is in place. Revocation, under (b)(5), must be in writing, and it does not reach anything the entity has already done in reliance on it, or an authorization obtained as a condition of insurance coverage where other law lets the insurer contest a claim.
The two routes that need no signature are what make this page's subject narrower than its reputation, and omitting them teaches the wrong rule.
The first is the personal representative. Section 164.502(g)(1) requires a covered entity to "treat a personal representative as the individual for purposes of this subchapter," and (g)(2) supplies the test: "If under applicable law a person has authority to act on behalf of an individual who is an adult or an emancipated minor in making decisions related to health care, a covered entity must treat such person as a personal representative . . . with respect to protected health information relevant to such personal representation." That is a mandatory instruction, and it is most of what a healthcare power of attorney is buying. Section 164.502(g)(4) does the same after death for an executor, administrator or other person with authority over the estate, and (g)(5) lets an entity decline to treat someone as personal representative where it reasonably believes the individual has been or may be subjected to domestic violence, abuse or neglect by that person, or that doing so could endanger them.
The second is section 164.510(b), and its verb is the point. A covered entity "may . . . disclose to a family member, other relative, or a close personal friend of the individual, or any other person identified by the individual, the protected health information directly relevant to such person's involvement" in the individual's care or payment for it, and may notify such a person of "the individual's location, general condition, or death." Where the individual is present and able to decide, the entity may act on their agreement, on an unopposed opportunity to object, or on a reasonable inference from the circumstances. Where the individual is absent or incapacitated, it may act on professional judgment about their best interests. After death, subsection (b)(5) permits the same disclosure to people who were involved before it, "unless doing so is inconsistent with any prior expressed preference of the individual that is known to the covered entity."
So the honest description of what the signed form adds is a narrow one, and it is still worth having. Section 164.510(b) is a permission, not a duty. A hospital that reads it cautiously, or a staff member who has been told to, can decline to say anything and be entirely within the rule. An authorization removes the judgment call: it names the people, it names the information, and refusing to honor a valid one is a different posture from declining to exercise a discretion. That is the whole of the case for signing one, and it is enough.
One more provision belongs on any page about health information and death. Section 164.502(f) requires a covered entity to protect a deceased individual's information "for a period of 50 years following the death of the individual." Privacy does not lapse at the funeral, which is why the personal-representative route at (g)(4) matters to an executor settling an estate with medical bills in it.