Issuer credit risk is not a footnote here; it is the instrument. Because the note is the issuing institution's unsecured obligation, the index it tracks and the money behind it are two different things. FINRA names the risk directly, warning of "the risk that the issuer will default on the note or take other actions that may impact the price of the ETN". If the issuer fails, a holder is a general creditor in the failure, and no feature of the payoff formula changes that. Bank-issued notes have delivered exactly this outcome before, and our page on structured products carries that history.
There is no net asset value, and the vocabulary borrowed from funds does not transfer. A fund's shares are measured against the value of what the fund holds. An ETN holds nothing, so the reference figure is one the issuer calculates. FINRA explains that issuers "issue and redeem notes as a means to keep the ETN's price in line with a calculated value, called the indicative value or closing indicative value", published at the end of each day by the issuer, and that ETNs "also typically have an intraday indicative value that is calculated and published every 15 seconds during the trading day". The formula for computing it is set out in the note's own prospectus or pricing supplement, and it is generally based on the underlying index minus fees, which FINRA notes are sometimes called daily investor fees and "vary across ETNs and can fluctuate for a given ETN".
The second risk is unusual enough that most buyers have never met it: the issuer controls supply. With an ETF, professional participants create and redeem shares to keep the price near the value of the holdings. With an ETN, the same job is done by the issuer, and FINRA is explicit that "the decision to issue additional notes is at the issuer's sole discretion". When issuance stops, the supply of notes stops, and demand can push the market price well above the indicative value. FINRA sets out a scenario in which an ETN traded at a premium of nearly 90 percent, driven in part by suspensions of new issuance, and then fell by more than half in two days when the issuer resumed issuing. The index behind it did not do that. The supply of notes did.
The escape hatch exists and is not usable at household scale. An investor can start a redemption before maturity by following the steps in the prospectus, generally beginning with a notice of redemption form. FINRA's own summary of why that does not help most people is blunt: given the steps in the process, the transaction fees, and "especially the large number of ETNs required to initiate a redemption (usually 25,000 or 50,000)", redemption "is not generally a practical source of liquidity for most retail investors". So the realistic exit is selling on the exchange, at whatever price the exchange offers, which is the price that can carry the premium.
What the product genuinely does well is worth stating alongside all of that. An ETN can track a benchmark that is awkward or expensive to hold, and because there is no portfolio to manage there is no tracking error from trading: the note pays the index return net of its stated fee, by contract. That is a real engineering advantage in markets where a fund would struggle, and it is the reason the structure exists rather than an accident of packaging. It is bought with issuer credit risk attached, and the two facts belong in the same sentence.
Nothing on the shelf separates a note from a fund. ETNs are quoted beside funds in the same screeners, with tickers of the same shape and product names built from the same words, and neither the ticker nor the name says which of the three exchange-traded structures is in front of you. FINRA's own framing is that ETNs "can be complex and carry numerous risks". The document that answers the question is the prospectus or pricing supplement, and it is the only place that reliably does.