The statute names the devices, which is more useful than a general prohibition. California's definition continues: "STOLI practices include, but are not limited to, cases in which life insurance is purchased with resources or guarantees from or through a person or entity, that, at the time of policy inception, could not lawfully initiate the policy himself, herself, or itself, and where, at the time of inception, there is an arrangement or agreement, to directly or indirectly transfer the ownership of the policy or the policy benefits to a third party." Two elements are described there and both have to be present in the described case: the money came from someone who could not have bought the policy directly, and there was an arrangement at inception to move the policy or its proceeds to a third party. That is a description of a financing structure rather than of a bad intention, which is what makes it something a regulator can act on.
Trusts get named separately, because the trust is the usual mechanism. The same subdivision provides that "[t]rusts that are created to give the appearance of insurable interest and that are used to initiate policies for investors violate insurable interest laws and the prohibition against wagering on life." The structure it describes is familiar: an irrevocable trust is created, nominally for the insured's benefit, the trust applies for and owns the policy, and the insured or a family member is named as beneficiary at issue. On paper the applicant has an insurable interest. In substance the trust exists to hold the policy until it can be transferred, and the statute treats the paper as what it is.
It is classified as fraud, and that is the practical difference from an ordinary void contract. California's definition of a "fraudulent life settlement act" reaches acts committed "for the purpose of depriving another of property or for pecuniary gain", and the list of acts it then gives includes "[e]ntering into stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI)". So the designation carries a purpose element rather than attaching to the label alone, though the purpose is what the structure is built for. A contract void for want of insurable interest simply fails: the insurer refuses the claim and the premiums are usually returned. A statutory fraud designation reaches people rather than paper, and it attaches to the arrangement itself rather than to any later dispute about a claim. That is why the topic lives inside the life settlement statutes rather than in the general law of insurance contracts, and why the people exposed are the promoters, financiers and licensees who assembled the transaction as well as anyone who signed at the kitchen table.
The boundary with the lawful market is drawn in the same sentence, and it must not be lost. The definition closes: "STOLI arrangements do not include lawful life settlement contracts as permitted by the act that added this section or those practices set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (k), provided that they are not for the purpose of evading regulation under this act." Selling an existing policy is a recognized, regulated transaction with its own licensing and disclosure regime, and the sale of a policy that was honestly bought years ago is not made suspect by the existence of STOLI. The line is when the investor's interest arose, not whether an investor is involved at the end.
What the arrangement costs the insured is not obvious from the pitch. The offer usually presents as free or nearly free insurance for a period, with a choice at the end between keeping the policy by repaying the financed premiums with interest and handing it over for a payment. Both branches are priced by the promoter in advance, using a measured life expectancy, and the branch the insured is expected to take is the one that transfers the policy. Beyond the economics, the insured has signed an application, answered financial underwriting questions about the purpose of the coverage, and become a party to an arrangement a state may define as fraud. The clearest warning sign is the one the statute itself describes: someone else is paying, and the paperwork contemplates the policy ending up somewhere other than with the insured or their family.