The shapes, and what each digit means. In 80/10/10, the first mortgage is 80 percent of the purchase price, the second lien is 10 percent, and the buyer puts 10 percent down. In 80/15/5 the second lien is 15 percent and the deposit is 5. The first number is the one doing the work, because 80 percent is where two separate thresholds sit: the point at which a conventional first mortgage stops requiring private mortgage insurance, and a common ceiling in lenders' own pricing grids. Either loan can be a fixed-rate second mortgage or a home equity line of credit, and which one it is changes the analysis considerably, because a line of credit typically carries a variable rate.
The comparison that decides it is not the one usually advertised. A piggyback is marketed as a way to avoid mortgage insurance, and it does avoid it. Whether that is an improvement depends on four things, and only the first gets discussed. The first is the rate on the second lien, which is usually well above the first mortgage rate because the lien sits behind it. The second is whether that rate is fixed, because a variable-rate line of credit transfers rate risk to the borrower for as long as the balance is outstanding. The third is that private mortgage insurance ends and a second mortgage does not: the Homeowners Protection Act gives a borrower a right to request cancellation, and requires automatic termination, once stated equity thresholds are reached, on the ladder the mortgage insurance page sets out, while a second lien ends only when it is paid off. The fourth is the interest deduction, which is worth checking rather than assuming, because acquisition indebtedness under Internal Revenue Code section 163(h)(3) can include debt incurred in acquiring the residence whether it sits in first or second position, subject to the overall limit.
The regulatory hook, and why it exists. Under 12 CFR 1026.43(c)(2)(iv), a creditor making a covered transaction must consider "the consumer's monthly payment on any simultaneous loan that the creditor knows or has reason to know will be made," calculated under (c)(6). The official commentary explains what that obliges a lender to do in practice: where the requested loan amount is less than the purchase price, the creditor's policies and procedures must require the consumer to state the source of the down payment and provide verification, and if the source turns out to be another extension of credit secured by the same dwelling, the payment on it has to be counted. This is a direct response to what happened before 2008, when piggyback seconds were routinely arranged outside the first-lien lender's view and the combined payment was never underwritten.
The conforming-limit use is a different motive with the same structure. On an expensive property, splitting the financing can keep the first mortgage at or under the baseline conforming loan limit, which for a one-unit property in most of the country is $832,750, and therefore inside conventional pricing rather than in the jumbo market. Whether that is worth doing turns on the spread between conforming and jumbo pricing at the time, which moves, and on the rate the second lien carries.
The sleeper cost is the refinance. A second lienholder does not automatically step aside when the first mortgage is replaced. To refinance the first, the borrower needs the second lienholder to sign a subordination agreement, and it is not obliged to. If it refuses, or takes months, or charges for it, the refinance either does not happen or has to pay off the second lien as well, which converts the transaction into a cash-out refinance at cash-out pricing. Borrowers who chose a piggyback in a high-rate year and want to refinance in a low-rate one meet this problem at exactly the wrong moment.
Where the second lien stands if things go wrong. A junior lienholder is paid only after the first is satisfied, which shapes what happens in a short sale or a foreclosure and is covered on the pages for those transactions and for home equity loans. The short version is that a second lien gives its holder a veto in a short sale, which is one of the main reasons those transactions fail.