The mechanics exist to replace collateral. A conventional lender manages risk with security, a credit history, and financial statements. A microlender usually has none of those, so the model substitutes other things: lending to a group whose members are jointly answerable for repayment, a repayment schedule of small and frequent installments that surfaces trouble early, loan sizes that step up only after a clean record, and a loan officer who visits rather than a branch the borrower visits. Those substitutions are labor-intensive by design, which is the source of the cost problem below.
Why the rates look punitive and why the comparison is not straightforward. A large part of the cost of making a loan is fixed per loan: assessing the borrower, disbursing, collecting, and following up. Those costs do not fall in proportion to principal, so the same dollars of cost sit on top of a much smaller loan and have to be recovered as a much larger percentage. An annual percentage rate computed on a $500 loan repaid weekly over six months therefore looks nothing like a rate on a mortgage, without either lender being unusual. The United States program concedes the point in its own design: 15 U.S.C. 636(m) authorizes the SBA both to fund loans through intermediaries and, separately, to make grants that "will enable such intermediaries to provide intensive marketing, management, and technical assistance to microloan borrowers." The assistance is paid for with appropriated money rather than out of the interest, because the interest cannot carry it.
The origin, and the reason the field is contested. The Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank "for their efforts to create economic and social development from below." That recognition, and the claims made around it, set an expectation that access to small loans would lift households out of poverty at scale. The strongest evidence available does not support that expectation at that strength. Summarizing six randomized evaluations across six countries on four continents, published together in the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics in 2015, Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman wrote that the studies show "a consistent pattern of modestly positive, but not transformative, effects." The honest reading is that expanded access to credit is a real service that people use and value, and that it is not, on this evidence, a poverty cure.
How a United States reader actually encounters it. Three ways, and they are different from one another. The SBA Microloan Program lends federal money to nonprofit intermediaries, which relend it to small businesses; 13 CFR 120.701 defines an Intermediary as "a private, nonprofit community development corporation or other entity" and a Specialized Intermediary as one "which maintains a portfolio of Microloans averaging $10,000 or less." Community development financial institutions, certified by the Treasury Department, do similar lending with a broader mandate. And retail products exist that let an individual put money into a microfinance portfolio, either as a donation, as a zero-interest recycled loan on a platform, or as a note that pays interest and carries credit risk. Those three are not the same transaction, and the third is an investment with the ordinary consequences of one.