The seven tests, and where each one actually bites. 26 CFR 1.469-5T(a) treats an individual as materially participating for the year if any of the following is true.
More than 500 hours of participation in the activity during the year.
The individual's participation "constitutes substantially all of the participation in such activity of all individuals," owners and non-owners alike. This is the sole-operator test, and it has no hour floor at all.
More than 100 hours of participation, and participation that "is not less than the participation in the activity of any other individual" for the year. Both limbs are required. More than 100 hours on its own is not this test, and it is the commonest way the test is misquoted.
The activity is a significant participation activity and the individual's aggregate participation in all significant participation activities during the year exceeds 500 hours. The definition sits one paragraph down: 1.469-5T(c)(2) makes an activity one of significant participation only if the individual participates for more than 100 hours in it, and 1.469-5T(c)(1)(ii) requires that it would not be material participation but for this test. So test 4 aggregates across activities rather than measuring one.
The individual materially participated in the activity, ignoring this test, "for any five taxable years (whether or not consecutive) during the ten taxable years that immediately precede the taxable year."
The activity is a personal service activity and the individual materially participated in it "for any three taxable years (whether or not consecutive) preceding the taxable year." 1.469-5T(d) defines a personal service activity as one involving personal services in health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts or consulting, or any other trade or business in which capital is not a material income-producing factor.
Based on all the facts and circumstances, the individual participates "on a regular, continuous, and substantial basis during such year."
Test 7 is not the safety net it looks like, and three separate paragraphs say so. 1.469-5T(b)(2)(iii) provides that an individual who participates for "100 hours or less during the taxable year" shall not be treated as materially participating under test 7. 1.469-5T(b)(2)(ii) then takes the individual's own management services out of the test-7 calculation altogether unless two conditions both hold for the year: no other person performing management services in connection with the activity receives compensation of the kind described in section 911(d)(2)(A), and no individual performs more management hours than the taxpayer. Read precisely, that paragraph does not switch test 7 off; it deletes the taxpayer's management hours from it. The practical effect is the same wherever management is most of what the owner does, which describes a rental with a paid property manager. And 1.469-5T(b)(2)(i) closes the door on borrowing a conclusion from elsewhere: satisfying a participation standard under any provision other than section 469, and the regulation names sections 1402 and 2032A specifically, "shall not be taken into account" here. The words are the same and the regimes are not.
What does not count as participation. Under 1.469-5T(f)(2)(ii)(A), work done in the individual's capacity as an investor is excluded unless the individual "is directly involved in the day-to-day management or operations of the activity," and the regulation names three examples of investor work: studying and reviewing financial statements or reports, preparing summaries or analyses for one's own use, and monitoring the finances or operations in a non-managerial capacity. Separately, 1.469-5T(f)(2)(i) excludes work that "is not of a type that is customarily done by an owner" where one of the principal purposes was to avoid the disallowance. The regulation's own illustration is a taxpayer paying a spouse to work as an office receptionist for a football team.
Limited partners get three tests, not seven. Section 469(h)(2) provides that, except as provided in regulations, no interest in a limited partnership held as a limited partner is treated as one in which the taxpayer materially participates. 1.469-5T(e)(2) supplies the exception, and it is narrow: the general rule does not apply where the individual would be treated as materially participating under paragraph (a)(1), (5) or (6). Those are the 500-hour test, the five-of-ten-years test and the personal-service test. Tests 2, 3, 4 and 7 are unavailable.
How participation is proved, which contradicts the advice most people have heard. 1.469-5T(f)(4) is titled "Methods of proof" and says the extent of participation "may be established by any reasonable means," that "contemporaneous daily time reports, logs, or similar documents are not required if the extent of such participation may be established by other reasonable means," and that reasonable means may include identifying the services performed over a period and the approximate hours spent, based on appointment books, calendars or narrative summaries. That is what the regulation says. It is not an argument for keeping no records, since the burden of establishing the hours still sits with the taxpayer and a reconstruction has to be credible on its own terms.
The two spousal rules point in opposite directions, and getting them backwards manufactures eligibility. For material participation, spousal hours count. Section 469(h)(5) says the participation of the spouse "shall be taken into account," and 1.469-5T(f)(3) is emphatic that it counts "without regard to whether the spouse owns an interest in the activity and without regard to whether the spouses file a joint return." For real estate professional status, they do not combine. The last sentences of section 469(c)(7)(B) provide that on a joint return the requirements "are satisfied if and only if either spouse separately satisfies such requirements," while adding that the activities in which a spouse materially participates are determined under subsection (h). So one spouse must clear the hours alone, and the material-participation question inside that test is still answered with both spouses' hours.
Real estate professional status does not make rentals non-passive by itself. This is the most misstated rule in the area, and Publication 925 states the correction plainly: rental activities are generally passive even if you materially participated in them, "however, if you qualified as a real estate professional, rental real estate activities in which you materially participated aren't passive activities." The statute confirms the two steps. Section 469(c)(7)(A)(i) does one thing only, switching off the per-se rental characterization, and 469(c)(7)(A)(ii) then treats each interest in rental real estate as a separate activity unless the taxpayer elects to treat them all as one. So an owner of six rentals must materially participate in each, or make the aggregation election.
The qualifying tests themselves are in section 469(c)(7)(B): more than half of the personal services the taxpayer performs in trades or businesses during the year must be performed in real property trades or businesses "in which the taxpayer materially participates," and the taxpayer must perform "more than 750 hours of services" during the year in such businesses. Both limbs require material participation in the real property business, so the test is recursive: working in real estate is not enough if the work does not clear a material-participation test there. Section 469(c)(7)(C) defines a real property trade or business broadly, as any real property development, redevelopment, construction, reconstruction, acquisition, conversion, rental, operation, management, leasing or brokerage trade or business. And section 469(c)(7)(D)(ii) carries the provision most often omitted: personal services performed as an employee do not count as performed in a real property trade or business unless the employee is a 5-percent owner of the employer, as defined in section 416(i)(1)(B). That single sentence excludes most salaried agents and property managers.
A note on the word "temporary," because it looks like a problem and is not. 1.469-5T has governed since T.D. 8175, published at 53 FR 5725 on February 25, 1988, amended through 61 FR 14247 in April 1996. Section 7805(e)(2) provides that "any temporary regulation shall expire within 3 years after the date of issuance," which would appear to have killed it long ago. But that subsection was added by Public Law 100-647, section 6232(b), which applies "to any regulation issued after the date which is 10 days after" the Act's enactment on November 10, 1988. This regulation was issued nine months before that date, so the sunset never reached it. It is fully operative, and the "T" is a dating artifact rather than a warning.