What the surviving 1975 regulation actually requires. Under 29 CFR 2510.3-21(c)(1), a person renders "investment advice" to a plan only if two things are both true. First, the person renders advice as to the value of securities or other property, or makes a recommendation as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling them. Second, the person either has discretionary authority or control over purchasing or selling securities or other property for the plan, or renders that advice "on a regular basis to the plan pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement or understanding" that the services "will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions with respect to plan assets", and that the person "will render individualized investment advice to the plan based on the particular needs of the plan". Counting the elements of the second route gives the familiar five parts: advice about investments, on a regular basis, under a mutual understanding, as a primary basis for decisions, individualized to the plan. Each is a separate hurdle, and failing any one of them means no fiduciary status under this route.
Why the Department kept trying to replace it. A test built around a regular, ongoing, mutually understood advisory relationship fits a plan that retains an adviser. It fits far less comfortably a single conversation in which someone recommends moving an entire retirement balance out of a workplace plan and into a product that pays them, which for many households is the largest financial decision they will ever make and is by its nature a one-time event. Both the 2016 rule and the 2024 rule were attempts to bring that conversation inside the definition. Neither survived.
The 2024 rule, in the Department's own account. The Retirement Security Rule was published on April 25, 2024. Two lawsuits followed, one in the Eastern District of Texas and one in the Northern District of Texas, and on July 25 and 26, 2024 those courts stayed the rule's effective date, with the second also staying amendments to a group of prohibited transaction exemptions. The consolidated appeal was dismissed by the Fifth Circuit on November 28, 2025 on the appellant's own motion, and final judgments followed in the district courts on March 12 and March 17, 2026. The Department then published a notice of court vacatur, effective April 20, 2026, whose reasoning is the cleanest statement available of where the law stands: "Because the 2024 Fiduciary Rule never became effective, and the Five-part Test Regulation was never replaced, this document takes the administrative steps necessary to conform the regulatory text in the CFR." The 2016 rule met a similar end, and the Department implemented that vacatur in the same administrative way in 2020.
The exemption survived; its explanation did not, and that distinction is the most consequential thing on this page. Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2020-02 permits an investment advice fiduciary to receive compensation that ERISA's prohibited transaction rules would otherwise forbid, subject to conditions, and it expressly covers rollover advice. It remains operative exactly as originally granted in December 2020, and the Department republished its operative text in full to make that clear. What did not survive is the preamble. Separate litigation vacated a 2021 guidance policy on rollover advice and then vacated portions of the exemption's preamble, and in the 2026 notice the Department went further, clarifying "its view that the entire preamble of PTE 2020-02 is effectively vacated" because the vacated portions are too entangled with the rest to leave the remainder reliable. So a reader who was told at some point that rollover advice is automatically fiduciary advice was probably reading, at one remove, guidance the Department no longer stands behind.
What this leaves, stated as fact rather than as advice. Retirement investment advice can be given by someone who is a fiduciary under ERISA, by someone who is a fiduciary under the Investment Advisers Act, by a broker-dealer subject to the SEC's best-interest standard for retail recommendations, or by an insurance agent subject to state suitability rules, and the same conversation can sit under more than one of those regimes or under none of the retirement-specific ones. The compensation attached to the recommendation does not change whether a duty applies, but it is the thing the duties are there to manage: a recommendation that moves money into a product paying the recommender is the fact pattern all three rulemaking attempts were aimed at. Because the regimes differ, the useful question is not "is my advisor a fiduciary?" but "under which rule, for this recommendation, and how is the person paid for it?" Both halves of that are answerable in writing before any money moves.