Double taxation is a description of two events, not one. The corporation pays 21 percent on its taxable income. A shareholder pays again only when profit is actually distributed as a dividend, or when the shareholder sells stock whose value reflects the retained profit. Nothing taxes the shareholder on the corporation's earnings as they accrue, which is the exact opposite of a pass-through, where the owner is taxed on their share whether or not a dollar is distributed. That difference is why the C corporation is not automatically the worse answer: a business reinvesting everything it earns may be better off paying 21 percent and deferring the second layer indefinitely than paying an owner's marginal rate on income they never receive.
The Code anticipates that argument and puts two limits on it. Section 531 imposes an accumulated earnings tax "equal to 20 percent of the accumulated taxable income" on a corporation described in section 532, which is one "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders ... by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." Section 532(c) adds that this applies "without regard to the number of shareholders," so it is not a closely-held-company rule. The escape is the accumulated earnings credit in section 535(c), which shelters earnings "retained for the reasonable needs of the business," subject to a minimum credit measured against $250,000 of accumulated earnings and profits. Section 535(c)(2)(B) halves that floor to $150,000 for a corporation whose principal function is performing services in health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, the performing arts or consulting, which describes a large share of the closely held corporations that would ever face the tax. Section 541 does the parallel job for a corporation whose income is mostly passive, imposing a personal holding company tax of 20 percent on undistributed personal holding company income. Neither is a common assessment, but both mean "retain it forever" is a strategy the Code already has an answer to.
What only a C corporation can do. Three reasons a business chooses the status deliberately rather than defaulting into it:
- Outside institutional equity. Venture funds and most institutional investors cannot or will not hold pass-through interests, and Subchapter S independently bars most of them: section 1361(b)(1) limits a small business corporation to 100 shareholders, to a single class of stock, and to shareholders who are individuals, estates and certain trusts. A C corporation has none of those constraints and can issue preferred stock.
- Qualified small business stock. The gain exclusion in section 1202 is available only for stock in a domestic C corporation, which is treated on its own page.
- Owner fringe benefits. An owner who is a genuine employee of a C corporation is treated as an employee for fringe-benefit purposes, which is not true of a more-than-2-percent S corporation shareholder or a partner.
Where the second layer actually bites. The painful case is not the growing company that reinvests. It is the profitable service business whose owner needs the money out every year, and the corporation that is eventually sold in an asset sale, where the corporation recognizes gain and pays 21 percent, and the shareholders pay again on the distribution of the proceeds. Converting to S status does not cure that history: a corporation that converts carries a built-in gains tax for a period after the election, which is treated on the S corporation page.
One accounting consequence worth knowing. Section 448(a) bars the cash method of accounting for a C corporation above a gross receipts threshold, which is a real compliance cost that pass-throughs of the same size may avoid. The mechanics of that bar, including its small-business exception, are covered on the cash method and accrual method pages.