Both conditions have to be satisfied at the same time, which is where the surprises come from. The statutory trigger is the first month in which the individual is 65 or older and enrolled in Part B. Someone who came onto Medicare before 65 through disability and has held Part B for years does not have a window running during those years; it opens the month they turn 65. Someone who delayed Part B while covered by an employer plan does not have a window at 65; it opens when Part B begins. Medicare states the second case explicitly, and adds a detail people miss: the period "starts once you sign up for Part B and lasts for 6 months, even if you sign up for Part B while you still have employer coverage." So signing up for Part B early, while intending to keep working, can start and finish the window while the person is not yet shopping for a supplement.
What the protection actually covers. Three separate things are barred, and the third is the one that matters most in practice. An insurer may not refuse to issue the policy. It may not condition the issuance or the effectiveness of the policy. And it may not discriminate in the pricing of the policy on grounds of health status, claims experience, receipt of health care or medical condition, which means the applicant is charged the same premium as any other applicant of their age and location. A guarantee of issuance without a guarantee of price would be worth very little, and the statute closes that door in the same sentence. Subparagraph (E) separately bars the use of genetic information in either the issuance or the pricing of a policy.
Guaranteed issue is not the same as no waiting period, and this is the distinction most consumer material collapses. Subparagraph (B) provides that subparagraph (A) "shall not be construed as preventing the exclusion of benefits under a policy, during its first 6 months, based on a pre-existing condition for which the policyholder received treatment or was otherwise diagnosed during the 6 months before the policy became effective." So an insurer that must sell the policy at the standard price may still decline to pay for a specific known condition for half a year. Two provisions cut that back. Subparagraph (D) credits prior continuous creditable coverage: six months or more of it and the policy "may not exclude benefits based on a pre-existing condition"; less than six months and the exclusion is reduced by the coverage the applicant has. And subparagraph (C) provides that a policy replacing another that has been in force for six months or longer may impose no new waiting period at all for similar benefits. Someone moving from an employer plan straight onto Medicare therefore usually carries enough creditable coverage to remove the exclusion outright.
Missing it is expensive in a way that has no annual fix. Outside this window and outside the specific guaranteed-issue situations the statute creates elsewhere, a Medigap insurer may use medical underwriting: it may ask health questions, charge more, or decline the application. There is no once-a-year opportunity that cures this, which is what makes the Medigap decision different in kind from the Medicare Advantage decision. Someone choosing Medicare Advantage at 65 and expecting to switch later should know that the route back is narrower, and generally runs through a trial right or another guaranteed-issue situation rather than through this window.
Two boundaries on how far the federal rule reaches. Medicare's own guide states that federal law "generally doesn't require insurance companies to sell Medigap policies to people who are under 65," while some states do require it and on their own terms. And several states add rights the federal statute does not contain, such as an annual or birthday period in which existing policyholders may switch without underwriting. Which states, and on what terms, is a question for a state insurance department, and a list assembled from secondary sources goes stale without warning.