The two routes, and the asymmetry between them. Section 101(g)(1) treats two categories of payment as though they were paid by reason of the insured's death: amounts received under a life insurance contract on the life of a terminally ill individual, and amounts received on the life of a chronically ill individual. For the terminal route, section 101(g)(4)(A) defines a terminally ill individual as one "who has been certified by a physician as having an illness or physical condition which can reasonably be expected to result in death in 24 months or less after the date of the certification." Nothing in the statute conditions that payment on what the money is spent on. The insured may use it for medical bills, a mortgage, travel, or anything else.
The chronic route is different, and the difference is the single most consequential fact about this benefit. Section 101(g)(3)(A)(i) provides that the treatment does not apply to a payment received by a chronically ill insured unless "such payment is for costs incurred by the payee (not compensated for by insurance or otherwise) for qualified long-term care services provided for the insured for such period." So the chronic side is, for tax purposes, a reimbursement mechanism: the money has to be matched to unreimbursed care costs. A page or a sales conversation that applies the costs-incurred condition to both routes, or that applies the 24-month certification to the chronic route, has the statute wrong in a way that changes what a claimant can safely do with the money.
Two qualifications on the chronic route. Section 101(g)(3)(C) provides that a payment "shall not fail to be described in subparagraph (A) by reason of being made on a per diem or other periodic basis without regard to the expenses incurred during the period to which the payment relates," so a per diem design is not disqualified merely for being a per diem. Section 101(g)(3)(D) then points to section 7702B(d) for a limitation on how much of a periodic payment gets the treatment. That limitation is not a cap on benefits and is frequently described as though it were; the mechanics are set out on the hybrid long-term care material, which owns them. What belongs here is the boundary: section 7702B(d)(1) states expressly that a payment is not taken into account "if the insured is a terminally ill individual (as defined in section 101(g)) at the time the payment is received." The per diem limitation therefore reaches the chronic route only, which is consistent with its sitting inside section 101(g)(3), a paragraph headed "Special rules for chronically ill insureds."
What it costs the policy, and what the insurer actually pays. Accelerating reduces the death benefit, and usually by more than the amount received. The insurer is paying early on money it expected to pay later, so it discounts for the time value and often charges an administrative fee, and some contracts reduce the death benefit by a lien plus accrued interest rather than by the cash paid. Where a policy loan is outstanding, the acceleration typically has to address it first. None of that is hidden, but it is in the rider form rather than in the illustration, and the number a claimant needs is the reduction in the death benefit per dollar received.
Two boundaries worth naming. Section 101(g)(5) switches the whole subsection off for a business-owned policy: it does not apply to an amount paid to a taxpayer other than the insured where that taxpayer has an insurable interest "by reason of the insured being a director, officer, or employee" or by reason of the insured being financially interested in the taxpayer's business. And section 101(g)(2) places viatical settlements, in which the policy itself is sold to a licensed settlement provider, inside the same subsection. Selling a policy and accelerating it are different transactions with different consequences for the beneficiary, and they have their own pages.